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THE AMMANATI AFFAIR: SEVEN CENTURIES OLD, AND 
NOT FEELING THE AGE
EUGENIO VACCARI*
Collectivity has been a central and seemingly indispensable feature of 
that distinct body of law dealing with insolvency situations. It follows 
that any attempt to analyse insolvency law which does not explain the 
deep structure of [the] collectivity rule must be considered a failure.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border In-
solvency (“UNCITRAL Model Law”) and the European Regulations on 
insolvency proceedings have promoted an incremental approach towards 
substantive harmonization. This strategy has not remained unquestioned. 
One of the major criticisms is that such a course of action overlooks the 
nature of the issues currently raised in multi-national and cross-disciplinary 
bankruptcy procedures.
This Article focuses on the Anglo-American bankruptcy tradition. It 
adopts a doctrinal methodology to question the conclusion that “collectivi-
ty” is and should be a procedural, objective and secondary notion in light of 
two case studies. It suggests that in the context of cross-border, cross-
disciplinary2 cases, equitable concepts could be employed to introduce a 
more nuanced understanding of the notion of “collectivity.” This should 
facilitate the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings3 alongside with 
their inclusiveness, finality and certainty.
This Article acknowledges that some of the discussed issues can be 
ascribed to the lack of mandatory guidance on group bankruptcies. This 
* PhD Candidate (City, University of London), LL.M. (London School of Economics and Political 
Science), Italian attorney-at-law. This Article is based on research conducted under the supervision of 
Professor Jason Chuah and supported by a Research Studentship from the City University London. I am 
greatly indebted to Professors Adrian J. Walters and Jay L. Westbrook for their insightful comments on 
this Article. The Article covers literature and case law published before November 20, 2017.
1. RIZWAAN JAMEEL MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 33
(2005).
2. “Cross-disciplinary” is herein used for cases where bankruptcy tenets clash with principles of 
other laws (i.e., contract, maritime, etc.) governing a transaction (and its effects), which is relevant for 
the bankruptcy case.
3. In this Article, the term “bankruptcy” refers to both corporate and personal cases.
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aspect has not been ignored. Recently, the EU Regulation 2015/848 on 
Insolvency Proceedings4 (“EU Recast Regulation”) has included a section 
on the treatment of group bankruptcies,5 albeit the implementation of its 
provisions is voluntary. A comprehensive recitation of the current debate, 
the existing challenges, and the solutions proposed and implemented to 
date are beyond the limits of this Article. A cursory analysis of them would 
not do the issues justice, hence it is omitted from this text.
II. THE NOTION OF “COLLECTIVITY”
“Collectivity” represents a central feature of any bankruptcy system.6
It is the essential condition for claimants to accept a limitation to their au-
tonomy and freedom of action and—in certain cases—unilateral amend-
ments to their mutual obligations with the debtor. If only one of them was 
free to pursue their individual interest to the damage of the (collective) 
procedure, the theoretical mutual agreement7 that justifies the existence of 
bankruptcy law collapses.
Despite its relevance, collectivity is an elusive concept, and it is fre-
quently misinterpreted as being a synonym of “automatic stay,” i.e., the 
prohibition of any creditor’s attempt to (continue to) collect from the debtor 
or the debtor’s property.8 This section investigates the current understand-
4. Regulation (EU) 2015/848, of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
Insolvency Proceedings (recast), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19.
5. Id. arts. 56–77.
6. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 225–
26 (1918) (“There are two necessary antecedents before [a bankruptcy] procedure of collective execu-
tion need be invoked: (a) insolvency, actual or apparent, of the debtor, and (b) plurality, actual or 
potential, of the creditors.”).
7. According to Thomas H. Jackson, bankruptcy law “reflects the kind of contract that creditors 
would agree to if they were able to negotiate with each other before extending credit. This is an applica-
tion of the Rawlsian notion of bargaining . . . behind a ‘veil of ignorance.’” THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 17 n.22 (Beard Books 2001) (1986) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971)).
8. For the U.S. notion of “automatic stay,” see ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 67 (7th ed. 2014) and 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 
(2006). To illustrate the scope of the automatic stay, see, among others, In re Green, No. 09-06673-8-
RDD, 2011 WL 5902502 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2011).
For the U.K. notion of “moratorium,” see IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 515–
22 (5th ed. 2017), VANESSA FINCH & DAVID MILMAN, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES 
AND PRINCIPLES 302–12 (3d ed. 2017), and Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, sch. B1, ¶¶ 40–45 (Eng.). 
Courts have been consistent in upholding the spirit and aim of the “rescue culture,” which this provision 
promotes. As a result, competitors have been barred from bringing an action against the debtor for 
infringement of intellectual property rights, unless with the prior authorisation of the administrator or 
the court. See, e.g., Biosource Techs. Inc. v. Axis Genetics plc [2000] 1 BCLC 286 (Eng.). The conflict-
ing interpretation of the Court of Session in Air Ecosse Ltd. v. Civil Aviation Auth. (1987) SC 285 
(Scot.)—which held that the moratorium applied only in respect of the actions of the creditors of the 
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ing of this principle in some national and international statutes to identify 
the commonly accepted features of this notion.
A. Collectivity in Statutes
In line with the established tradition, the UNCITRAL Model Law pre-
scribes that for a proceeding to qualify for relief under its rules, it must be 
collective:
For the purposes of this Law:
(a) “Foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or administrative 
proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, pursuant 
to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs 
of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for 
the purpose of reorganization or liquidation . . . .9
To seek further guidance on the notion of collectivity, it is only appro-
priate to look at the UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment and Interpretation10
(“UNCITRAL Guide”). The UNCITRAL Guide rightly clarifies that col-
lectivity has nothing to do with the goal of the bankruptcy procedure. It is 
immaterial, in other words, if the procedure is designed to collect and liq-
uidate assets and distribute proceedings, or to restructure the business.
Pursuant to the UNCITRAL Guide, a proceeding is collective when it 
is designed to offer a coordinated, global solution for all stakeholders in 
bankruptcy proceedings. The legal interests of all parties should be ade-
quately represented. Key considerations to determine if a procedure is col-
lective are whether:
? substantially all of the assets and liabilities of the debtor are 
dealt with (but the rights of a class of creditors may remain 
unaffected); and
? the creditors who are adversely affected by the proceedings 
have a right to submit claims, participate in the procedure, and 
receive an equitable distribution.11
company, but not of its competitors—has never been considered a good authority on this point by 
English courts. See generally Biosource Techs. Inc., [2000] BCLC. 286 (reviewing cases).
9. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9Y3-NR8B] [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
10. See id. at 39–40. The U.S. Congress has specifically instructed the courts to look at the expla-
nations in the Guide if they find a provision in the U.S. statutes (i.e., chapter 15) to be unclear or am-
biguous. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 105–06 (2005).
11. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 9, at 40.
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The notion of collective proceedings is flexible enough to include 
compulsory and voluntary, corporate and individual, debtor-in-possession 
or independent expert-led procedures.
The analysis of the wording of these documents suggests that, despite 
some suggestions to the contrary (such as the use of words like “stakehold-
ers”), the UNCITRAL Model Law focuses on the contractual relationship 
between debtor and creditors to determine if proceedings are collective. In 
other words, bankruptcy proceedings are collective whenever their proce-
dural net captures substantially all the assets and liabilities of the debtor 
and its contractual creditors are forced to sit at the bankruptcy table.
Even more explicit in its procedural approach is the EU Recast Regu-
lation. The previous version, EU Regulation 1346/200012 (“EC Insolvency 
Regulation”), required “the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidator” for proceedings to be collective.13 The latest 
version shifts the emphasis from the goal of the procedure (divestment of 
assets) to its content (participation of the creditors). Accordingly, the EU 
Recast Regulation characterises as “collective” any bankruptcy proceedings 
that include “all or a significant part of a debtor’s creditors, provided that, 
in the latter case, the proceedings do not affect the claims of creditors 
which are not involved in them.”14
It follows that under both the UNCITRAL Model Law and the EU 
rules, collectivity is a procedural pre-condition to recognise foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings within the jurisdiction of another ratifying or EU mem-
ber state. However, neither of these laws provides substantive guidance on 
how this notion should be interpreted. Additionally, despite the use of the 
term “stakeholder” in the UNCITRAL Guide, it appears that there is no 
obligation to extend the collective nature of the procedure beyond contrac-
tual creditors.
This approach is consistent with other examples of international 
frameworks for harmonising bankruptcy laws. For instance, principle 3 of 
the IBA Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat15 refers to collectivity as a 
practical aspect to achieve coordination in cross-border proceedings. The 
12. Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000, of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 
O.J. (L 160) 1.
13. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1.
14. Regulation 2015/848, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
15. Int’l Bar Ass’n, Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (May 31, 1996), 
https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/International%20Bar%20Association%20%20Cross-
Border%20Insolvency%20Concor.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZJH-9EW9]. The Concordat was adopted by 
the Council of the International Bar Association Section on Business Law in Paris on September 17, 
1995, and by the Council of International Bar Association in Madrid on May 31, 1996. Id.
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collective nature of the cross-border bankruptcy procedure does not result 
by itself in the autonomous recognition of new, substantive rights to any of 
the parties (i.e., creditors) involved.16
Similarly, in Principles of European Insolvency Law, the International 
Working Group in European Insolvency Law has identified some common 
characteristics shared by European domestic bankruptcy systems.17 Once 
again, collectivity is understood as a synonym for a collection and conver-
sion mechanism18 designed to promote the creditors’ collective interests.19
* * *
As stated in the introduction of this section, the concept of collectivity 
represents a central feature in the Anglo-American bankruptcy system. It is 
therefore appropriate to look at the statutory definition of collective bank-
ruptcy proceedings in each of these jurisdictions.
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the English legal sys-
tem (England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland) has been long in the 
making. Section 14 of the Insolvency Act 2000 (“IA 2000”) authorised the 
Secretary of State to introduce by regulation “any provision which he con-
siders necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect, with or with-
out modifications, to the model law on cross-border insolvency.”20 Despite 
that, it was only with the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 
(“CBIR 2006”) that Great Britain implemented the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.
Surprisingly, there is no statutory definition of “collective insolvency 
proceeding” under the law, not even in section 426 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (“IA 1986”).21 However, “foreign proceeding” is defined as
a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, in-
cluding an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in 
which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to con-
16. Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the 
Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 547 (1996). For an analysis of the 
implications that the Concordat may have on cross-border bankruptcy cases, see David H. Culmer, The
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It Ripe Yet? 14 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 563 (1999).
17. See generally 4 LAW OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE: PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY 
LAW (William W. McBryde et al. eds., 2003).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Insolvency Act 2000, c. 39, § 14(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
21. This is the section of the Insolvency Act that dictates guidelines on cooperation between 
courts from selected, mainly Commonwealth, countries that exercise jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. 
See Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 426 (Eng.).
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trol or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganisation 
or liquidation.22
It seems therefore that the U.K. definition places less emphasis on the 
participation of the creditors, and more on the nature and purpose of the 
proceeding. This view seemed to be supported in Cambridge Gas,23 where 
the Privy Council held that an order of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York was enforceable in the United Kingdom even if some 
of the shareholders of an insolvent Isle of Man company had not submitted 
to its jurisdiction.
This position was distinguished in the joint appeal of Rubin,24 where 
the U.K. Supreme Court held that Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided 
and that recognition of one of the two foreign proceedings submitted to its 
analysis could not be allowed.
At common law and under the 1933 Act, a foreign court has jurisdic-
tion to give a judgment in personam capable of being enforced in the U.K. 
if the person against whom it is given was present in that country when the 
proceedings were instituted, claimed or counterclaimed in the proceedings, 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by voluntarily appearing in the 
proceedings, or had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court (the 
“Dicey rule”).
While the Supreme Court treated the foreign decisions in the appealed 
cases of Rubin25 and New Cap26 as “judgments against third parties,” it is 
implied that the U.K.’s most senior court is unwilling to recognise and 
enforce foreign proceedings where procedural rights of contractual claim-
ants are not upheld. As a result, the current position of the English judiciary 
is substantially aligned with the procedural notion of collectivity recog-
nised in the international documents mentioned above.
Finally, with reference to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the law defines 
“foreign proceeding[s]” as any
collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, in-
cluding an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or ad-
justment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor 
22. Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030, art. 2(i) (Gr. Brit.).
23. Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Hold-
ings PLC [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (appeal taken from Isle of Man).
24. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.).
25. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA (Civ) 895, [61], [2011] Ch 133 (Eng.).
26. New Cap Reins. Corp. Ltd. v. Grant (In re New Cap Reins. Corp. Ltd.) [2011] EWCA (Civ) 
971, [66] (Eng.).
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are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose 
of reorganization or liquidation.27
This general definition seems to apply also to cross-border bankruptcy 
procedures, as § 1502(4) and (5) of chapter 1528 do not introduce special 
criteria for them.
It is also significant that Congress decided to include the words “or 
adjustment for debt” in the definition. As explained in House Report 
109-31, Congress wanted to extend the scope of the recognition procedure 
to all cases in which the debtor is in financial distress, yet not necessarily 
insolvent. Therefore, the U.S. recognition procedure applies to cases in 
which the traditional bankruptcy rules on distribution and on the character-
ization of claims do not apply.
* * *
To conclude, it appears that all the national and international laws ana-
lysed in this section adopt a similar, procedural definition of collective 
procedure. To provide recognition and assistance to a foreign representa-
tive, the foreign procedure shall feature the following three key elements:
1. be regulated by a bankruptcy law, while the content and goal 
of the procedure are immanent;
2. offer a coordinated, global solution to the debtor’s distress; 
and
3. represent the interest of all the creditors.
The next section investigates whether academics and judges have dif-
ferent views on the matter.
B. Collectivity: Cases and Opinions in the United Kingdom
This section investigates how the notion of collectivity has been inter-
preted by English judges, by the academic literature and in governmental 
documents, to determine if there are significant discrepancies between the 
“practical” and statutory understanding of this notion.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2012).
28. Chapter 15, which replaces section 304 of the 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, is the portion of 
the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code that incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law in the United States. 
See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, 
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, and 26 U.S.C.).
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***
In the recognition procedure, the matter of whether a foreign proceed-
ing is collective is only cursorily addressed by U.K. courts. The collective 
nature of the foreign proceeding is frequently assumed. Courts address 
specific complains only if it is manifest that there is a significant doubt over 
the procedural, collective nature of the foreign proceeding.
For instance, in In re 19 Entertainment, the court held that:
Article 2 of the [CBIR 2006] defines the term ‘foreign proceeding’ to 
mean a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign state 
pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets 
and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign 
court for the purpose of reorganisation or liquidation. The evi-
dence . . . to which I have referred already, and it is not necessary for me 
to refer more fully on this point to the body of his report, persuades me 
completely that the proceedings are ‘foreign proceedings’ within the 
meaning of the 1986 Regulations.29
In re 19 Entertainment is one of the last decisions in a long line of 
cases that treated collectivity as a procedural requirement. Other examples 
include In re Lines Bros30 and In re Stanford International Bank.31
In the latter, the Court of Appeal had to determine, in a competing ap-
plication from an Antiguan liquidator and an U.S. receiver, which of the 
two procedures should be considered the “foreign main procedure.” The 
Court of Appeal affirmed on the point the decision of Judge Lewinson and 
held that the U.S. receivership was not “collective” in the relevant sense 
because it was for the protection of the debtor’s assets and its investors, and 
not the wider class of creditors generally, notwithstanding the occasional 
reference to claimants in the orders.
Stanford International Bank is a significant case because the ruling 
does not clarify if the Learned Judges considered—as requested by the 
counsel for the U.S. receiver—that paragraph 6 of the U.S. district judge’s 
amended order enabled the receiver to seek relief on behalf of the bank 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.32 We also do not know if they paid suffi-
cient regard to the extent of the powers conferred on the receiver under 
29. In re 19 Entertainment Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch)1545, [14] (Eng.).
30. In re Lines Bros Ltd. [1983] Ch 1 at 20 (Eng.); see also Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings PLC [2006] UKPC 26, [15], [2007] 1 
AC 508 (appeal taken from Isle of Man) (“The important point is that bankruptcy, whether personal or 
corporate, is a collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them.”).
31. In re Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd. [2010] EWCA (Civ) 137, [2011] 1 Ch 33 (Eng.).
32. See id. [18], [21]; see also SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3-09CV0298-L, 2009 WL 
9123278 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009).
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U.S. common law (paragraph 2 of the original order). Such powers enabled 
the receiver to propose an appropriate plan which included all creditors for 
the distribution of the assets vested in him or under his control to the court.
Following Rubin, courts have further strengthened their procedural 
approach, as evidenced by Isis Investments.33 In OGX,34 albeit in an obiter 
dictum, the High Court clarified that the right to be heard cannot be in-
voked by any claimant. In particular, the court observed that only directly
affected parties should be included in a bankruptcy proceeding for that 
procedure to be considered collective.35
The case that most recently touched on the notion of collectivity is the 
U.K. recognition of the “extraordinary administration” filed by Agrokor 
DD, a company incorporated in Croatia. In Agrokor,36 the plaintiff (Sber-
bank, a Russian bank) opposed the recognition of the Croatian bankruptcy 
procedure in Great Britain, under schedule 1, article 2(i) of the CBIR 
2006,37 on several grounds, including that the Croatian procedure was not 
collective.
Sberbank argued that “collective” refers to any bankruptcy procedure 
that deals with all of the debtor’s assets and liabilities and their creditors. 
As Croatian law extended this concept to a group level, solvent companies 
were also drawn into the procedure, and the estate pool would have been 
distributed not only for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors, but also for the 
creditors of its (sometimes solvent) subsidiaries.
In other words, the High Court was asked to reject the recognition on 
the argument that the Croatian extraordinary administration was too proce-
durally collective. Following the precedents mentioned above (and, in par-
ticular, Stanford International Bank), the court rejected this reasoning, 
without looking at whether the interests of the claimant would have been 
33. Isis Invs. Ltd. v. Oscatello Invs. Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Ch) 7 (Eng.). The High Court followed 
Rubin and refused to grant a stay of the English proceedings to favour the related proceedings in the Isle 
of Man because—among other reasons—some of the parties in the U.K. litigation were not part of the 
Manx proceedings.
34. Nordic Trustee A.S.A. v. OGX Petróleo e Gás S.A. (In re OGX Petróleo e Gás S.A.) [2016] 
EWHC (Ch) 25 (Eng.).
35. Id. [50] (“So, for example, if the party is a secured creditor, he will be regarded as standing 
outside the collective process, and the automatic stay under section 130(2) will invariably be lifted to 
enable him to enforce his security.”).
36. In re Agrokor DD [2017] EWHC (Ch) 2791 (Eng.).
37. While both Croatia and the United Kingdom are EU member states, the EU Recast Regulation 
could not apply to this procedure as, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 1, the automatic recognition is 
granted only for those bankruptcy proceedings which are listed in annex A of the regulation. The Croa-
tian extraordinary administration proceeding was enacted by the government shortly before the compa-
ny filed for its protection, and at the time of writing it is not yet included in that list. See Regulation 
2015/848, supra note 4, art 1, ¶ 1, annex A; Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030, 
art. 2(i).
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affected—positively or negatively—by this broad understanding of collec-
tivity. The court seemed to hold the view that, so long as all creditors are 
represented, and all assets and liabilities fall into the same pot, the collec-
tivity of the procedure cannot be questioned.
Undeniably, this case also touches on the issue of procedural and sub-
stantive consolidation in the case of bankruptcy of a group of enterprises. 
Generally speaking, procedural consolidation occurs when the distinct pro-
ceedings of the entities that formed part of a group of companies are heard 
simultaneously by the same judge, while the consolidation becomes “sub-
stantive” when the estates are merged. In other words, substantive consoli-
dation includes “the pooling of assets and liabilities of separate but related 
legal entities to effect an equitable distribution of value to stakeholders.”38
Substantive consolidation is extremely controversial, as it is recog-
nised only in certain jurisdictions. This may explain Sberbank’s surprised
reaction to the Croatian statutory mechanism. However, in the English 
case, Judge Matthews held that it was not necessary for him to address this 
aspect as the recognition was sought only with reference to a particular 
individual debtor, and not the network of companies.
Time will tell if the characterization proposed by Judge Matthews will 
hold up on appeal (if any). However, as a matter of fact, in this case collec-
tivity, and not consolidation, was the issue touched on and addressed in the 
court’s opinion, and the court did not depart from the established case law.
* * *
This procedural understanding of the law is rarely questioned by 
commentators. One such example is Look Chan Ho,39 who finds the ap-
proach adopted by U.K. courts (especially in Stanford International Bank)
too mechanic and superficial.
Other commentators, however, are far less critical. Professor Goode, 
for instance, states that collectivity entails the abandonment of individual, 
executory actions against the debtor, which are replaced by “collective
actions by the creditors as a whole,”40 while individual rights are converted 
38. Craig Martin, United States, in 1 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 597, 637 (Look Chan Ho ed., 4th ed. 2017).
39. Look Chan Ho, England, in 1 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 38, at 163, 178 (criticising the method, but not the basic under-
standing that “[f]or a proceeding to be collective, it must concern all creditors generally”).
40. ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 64–65 (4th ed. 2011) (emphasis 
added).
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into rights of proof in competition with other creditors.41 In line with OGX,
he also observes that in liquidation cases (and, possibly, in rescue cases 
where the concerned assets are not essential for the turnaround effort), en-
forcement of security interests or other real rights should not be affected. 
As a result, the persons who benefit from these interests or rights are not 
touched by the collective nature of the procedure, and they should not be 
heard for a procedure to be collective.
Goode’s view is shared by his fellow colleague Ian Fletcher,42 who
starts from the assumption that the majority of bankruptcy procedures (with 
the exception of receivership) are collective in nature. Once again, collec-
tivity represents the right of any claimant to be included in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, which shall be carried out to promote the collective interest of 
the procedure, and not the specific, peculiar interests of some of its partici-
pants or a class of creditors.
Finally, this uniformity of approach towards the procedural under-
standing of the notion of collectivity is neither questioned by the govern-
ment nor by practitioners.43 Particularly, in the government’s view, 
collective procedures are “proceedings in which all creditors participate, 
under which a duty is owed to all creditors and in which all creditors may 
look to an office holder for an account of his dealings with the company’s 
assets.”44
To conclude, it is possible to observe that in the United Kingdom, the 
procedural notion that has emerged in the case law is fully supported by the 
other main bankruptcy players, i.e., academics, practitioners, and the legis-
lature. The next section explores the notion and content of collectivity in 
the other jurisdiction considered in this study, namely, the United States.
41. In the same vein, see generally Gabriel Moss, Principles of EU Insolvency Law, INSOLVENCY 
INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 2015, at 40 (U.K.) (arguing that the notion of collectivity is a synonym of “unity,”
and it is used to describe the situation in which we have one proceeding in one country for all of the 
debtors’ assets and affairs), Hamish Anderson, What is the Purpose of Insolvency Proceedings?, 8 J.
BUS. L. 670 (2016) (arguing that collectivity means to operate for the benefit of all creditors), and ROY
GOODE, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW (Ewan McKendrick ed., 5th ed. 2016).
42. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 3 (“[A] central tenet of the collectivity principle [is] that the 
debtor’s assets are administered, and creditors’ claims processed, without any regard for the chronolog-
ical order in which assets were acquired or debts created.”).
43. See, e.g., Morgan Bowen, An Introduction to the Fundamental Principles Governing Cross-
Border Insolvency in an English Law Context, INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L, Sept. 2012, at 
19.
44. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, INSOLVENCY—A SECOND 
CHANCE, 2001, Cm. 5234, ¶ 2.5 (U.K.).
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C. Collectivity: Cases and Opinion in the United States
As both the United Kingdom and the United States are common law 
countries, this Article looks at case law first to determine the established 
notion of collectivity in bankruptcy procedures.
There is no shortage of such cases in the United States.45 At first 
glance, it appears that American judges have adopted the same, procedural 
approach as their English colleagues. In Board of Directors of Hopewell,46
the court held that a Bermuda “scheme of arrangement” for creditors was 
collective in nature because all creditors had a right to object to the pro-
posed schemes and the court was involved in approving all plans. Probably
the most widely known example of this approach is the decision in 
Betcorp,47 where the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada held that 
“[a] collective proceeding is one that considers the rights and obligations 
of all creditors.”48
In this case for U.S. recognition of a voluntary liquidation initiated in 
Australia, the court concluded that the Australian proceeding was “collec-
tive in nature,” despite the absence of any judicial procedure or supervision 
and of any assertion or allegation that the debtor was insolvent. This was 
because Australian law on voluntary liquidation outlawed any attempt by a 
creditor to undermine the orderly, cooperative system that accounted for 
the rights of all creditors. The court considered that this element was suffi-
cient to classify the procedure as collective.
Betcorp was followed in other districts, including in New York49 and
Delaware.50 In British American Insurance,51 however, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of Florida suggested that
[i]n determining whether a particular foreign action is collective as con-
templated under [the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “foreign proceed-
ing”], it is appropriate to consider both the law governing the foreign 
action and the parameters of the particular proceeding as defined in, for 
example, orders of a foreign tribunal overseeing the action.52
45. Martin, supra note 38, at 614.
46. In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 275 B.R. 699, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
47. In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009).
48. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
49. See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 369–70 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying the 
recognition in the United States of an Israeli receivership procedure, as it was not designed to protect 
the interests of all the creditors as a whole).
50. See In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 445 B.R. 318, 328–30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), aff’d, 728 
F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2013).
51. In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
52. Id. at 902 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2012)); see 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)–(5).
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This court therefore recommended the use of a holistic approach to
assess the nature of the foreign bankruptcy procedure. It is suggested that it 
is only appropriate to carry out a factual analysis of the laws of the jurisdic-
tions where proceedings had been initiated to determine if their provisions 
satisfy this prong of the definition of foreign proceeding.
Two years later, this holistic approach was followed by New York 
bankruptcy judges in the Ashapura53 case. This was an application for the 
recognition, under chapter 15, of the proceeding before India’s Board for 
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (“BIFR”) to rehabilitate the debt-
or’s finances under the Indian Sick Industrial Companies Act (“SICA”). 
Although SICA did not provide a formal mechanism for the participation of 
unsecured creditors, the debtor was allowed to prove to the satisfaction of 
the court that, in practice, the proceeding considered the interests of all 
creditors, as it involved parties other than just one class of creditors or one 
party-in-interest. The applicant also proved that the combination of actual 
and published notice in the procedure was adequate, there were formal 
mechanisms for the court to review adverse determinations, and distribu-
tion generally occurred according to statutory priorities.
In this case, the court conceded that “[i]n determining whether a par-
ticular foreign action is collective . . . it is appropriate to consider both the 
law governing the foreign action and the parameters of the particular pro-
ceeding as defined in, for example, orders of a foreign tribunal overseeing 
the action.”54
Ashapura did not innovate the test to determine if a foreign procedure 
is collective. Nevertheless, applicants are given more opportunities to fac-
tually prove that a procedure meets the criteria established by the U.S. 
Code, as interpreted by the judiciary.
This approach was followed in other more recent cases, such as the 
decision in Irish Bank Resolution Corp.,55 where the District Court for the 
District of Delaware authorised the recognition of a proceeding to wind-up
an Irish bank notwithstanding the assertion that the Irish Finance Minister 
who supervised proceeding might give priority to any assets to the Irish 
state.56 The Southern District of New York recently reinstated this ap-
53. Armada (Singapore) Pte Ltd. v. Shah (In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd.), 480 B.R. 129, 140–42
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
54. Id. at 136 (quoting In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. at 902).
55. Flynn v. Wallace (In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd.), 538 B.R. 692 (D. Del. 2015).
56. The Irish liquidator was able to prove that the assets would have been distributed in accord-
ance with distribution scheme set forth in Ireland’s Companies Act, and not in a discretionary manner. 
Id. at 698.
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proach in Poymanov,57 where the court admitted the use of expert witnesses 
to determine if a foreign bankruptcy procedure was collective.
To conclude, the collectivity requirement is proven whenever a for-
eign proceeding considers the rights and obligations of all creditors (e.g., 
ABC Learning, Betcorp). For a legislative choice, the interests of third par-
ties are ignored (in accordance with the approach suggested in the 
UNCITRAL Guide). If the proceeding is in the interest of a single creditor 
(such as in Gold & Honey) or if notice is not given to all creditors (such as 
in British American Insurance and ABC Learning), recognition may be 
refused.
After Ashapura, it seems that all courts are moving from a rubber-
stamp approach to a more holistic, factual analysis of the circumstances of 
the case. As a result, the notion of collectivity “can encompass a proceed-
ing in which not every class of claim is subject to compromise where sig-
nificant amount of financial debt, like issuance of bond debt or syndicated 
or bilateral bank debt alone, are subject to compromise in a foreign insol-
vency proceeding.”58
* * *
In turning our analysis to the literature review, bankruptcy scholarship 
has long been dominated by the “creditors’ bargain model” (“CBM”). This 
theory—first introduced by scholars like Jackson, Baird, and Shanker59—
has been pervasive in influencing the understanding of some key pillars of 
this area of law, including the notion of collectivity.
This procedural understanding, however, is not without critics. For in-
stance, Elizabeth Warren observed that in enacting the Bankruptcy Act, 
Congress wanted to promote policies capable of protecting the values and 
expectations of the community and a wide range of participants. Restricting 
collectivity to a debtor–creditors debate can hardly ensure that the proce-
dure achieves the “‘public interest’ beyond the interests of the disputing 
parties.”60
57. In re Poymanov, 571 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
58. Martin, supra note 38, at 613.
59. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (arguing that bankruptcy law should deal only with inter-creditor 
questions on the basis of the creditors’ bargain model); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested 
Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998); Morris G. Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy 
Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1975) (asserting that rules valid only in front of bankruptcy courts 
are a tension-creating situation).
60. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 788 (1987) (emphasis added) 
(quoting 124 CONG. REC. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini)).
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It seems therefore that a value-oriented notion of bankruptcy law may 
overcome the shortcomings of a rational, procedural approach to the notion 
of collectivity. Bankruptcy law should be seen as the arena where parties
compete over their legitimate expectations, rather than over their legiti-
mate, contractual claims.
The risk implicit in this approach is that it proves too much, and that it 
overextends the limits of this area of law. In many cases, especially those 
involving micro, small, and medium enterprises (“MSMEs”), the public 
interest is the interest of the contracting parties. Anchoring the notion of 
collectivity with societal values may cause—rather than promote the solu-
tion of—distributive issues, without effectively enhancing the protection 
offered to unsecured or non-contractual participants. It may simply result in 
a reduction of the pareto efficiency of the system.
In the same line of thinking with Elizabeth Warren, but with the pur-
pose of overcoming some of the limits of her theory, Lawrence Ponoroff61
suggested (albeit with reference to personal bankruptcies) that collective 
goals and substantive fairness could be ensured only by the active involve-
ment and discretion of bankruptcy judges, even at the price of losing some 
degree of uniformity. Following the remarks of Jack Williams,62 he sug-
gested that only a decentralised approach could recognise the intrinsic val-
ue and dignity of all participants in the process.
This is one of the few cases in the Anglo-American tradition in which 
the word “collectivity” is used to promote substantive values for society as 
a whole, rather than procedural equality among participants as part of the 
procedure. The majority view, however, is much less radical.63
61. Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the 
Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 173, 216–17, 216 n.209 (2000).
62. Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 105, 130–31 (1999).
63. Among others: John A.E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Prob-
lems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests,” 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2006). The author 
seems to suggest the use of a broader notion of collectivity. He claims that “bankruptcy proceedings are
in rem and bind all potential stakeholders in the debtor’s property. This broad-sweeping and compulso-
ry law corrals those constituents who would prefer to defer collective resolution and deal with their 
debts on an individual in personam basis.” Id. at 1902 (footnote omitted). However, reference to broad 
concepts such as “stakeholders” and “constituents” is misleading, as the author appears to adhere to the 
CBM scholarship. In other words, Pottow does not question the procedural nature of the collective 
action problem. See id. at 1916.
846 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:3
D. Collectivity: Conclusive Remarks
To conclude, Sections II.B and II.C of this paper have demonstrated 
that in the United Kingdom and the United States there is a widespread 
acknowledgment, both in the doctrine and in the judiciary, that the collec-
tive nature of bankruptcy law is primarily procedural. Collectivity results in 
the freeze of individual, executory actions against the insolvent debtor, and 
in the creation of an inclusive procedure where all contractual claimants 
affected by the debtor’s insolvency should take part.
This notion is not challenged outside the Anglo-American tradition ei-
ther. As observed by Bob Wessels, the principle of collectivity determines 
the freeze of individual action by creditors and substitutes this right with 
the “idea of the rule of joint execution against the assets of the insolvent 
debtor.”64
The procedural notion of collectivity can be summarised in the credi-
tor’s right to take part in the bankruptcy proceeding against their debtor. It 
is frequently recognised only to contractual creditors, and it is rarely ever 
understood as an entitlement to claim new rights or to amend existing 
rights in bankruptcy. Only rarely the circumstances of a case may lead the 
court to conclude that the procedure is not collective in nature.
This shared view of the procedural nature of the notion of collectivity 
is a remarkable achievement in a sector made distinctive by the frequent 
lack of agreement and commonalities between national laws. It is seldom 
questioned or even commented on. For instance, in his latest book Princi-
ples of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Reinhard Bork did not even consider 
collectivity as having an autonomous standing among the principles of the 
cross-border insolvency practice.65
The next section introduces the first of these case studies, the collapse 
of O.W. Bunker, to investigate if this procedural understanding of the no-
tion of collectivity may have influenced the parties of that case to pursue 
their individual claims outside the bankruptcy context.
64. Bob Wessels, Europe Deserves a New Approach to Insolvency Proceedings, 4 EUR.
COMPANY L. 253, 254 (2007) (Neth.) (emphasis added).
65. See generally REINHARD BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW (2017).
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III. THE COLLAPSE OF O.W. BUNKER
It is an understatement that O.W. Bunker’s collapse caused a signifi-
cant disruption in the world of maritime bunkers and bankruptcy practice.66
As observed:
The collapse of O.W. Bunker has led to a frenzy of actual and threatened 
vessel arrests and delays, and vessel owners have faced demands for 
double payment. The split decisions from courts around the world illus-
trate the difficulties arising from a bankruptcy in which contractual 
claims and maritime lien claims interact.67
Before filing for bankruptcy, O.W. Bunker was the leading global in-
dependent marine fuel (bunker) company. Founded in Denmark in 1980, it 
had operations in twenty-nine countries. It acted as a physical distributor 
and reseller of marine fuel. It also provided risk-management solutions to 
control costs, minimise risk, and protect against market fluctuations. At the 
end of 2013, O.W. Bunker was the second-largest listed company in Den-
mark after Maersk.
O.W. Bunker fulfilled its request for fuel bunkers from maritime oper-
ators by a chain of contracts with subsidiaries and independent suppliers. 
Each contract contained a retention of title (“ROT”) clause in favour of the 
supplier, and a provision that payment was due a fixed number of days 
after delivery. Some of these suppliers, depending on the law governing 
their contracts, also were believed to have a maritime lien on the vessel for 
the provision of necessaries.
Each supplier gave permission for the ship owner to consume the bun-
kers while payment was pending as the vessel went about its business, thus 
impliedly accepting that all or substantially all fuel bunkers may be con-
sumed before payment became due.
On December 19, 2013, O.W. Bunker signed an English omnibus se-
curity agreement with ING Bank.68 ING acted as a syndicate of lenders to 
the O.W. Bunker group, which assigned and charged to ING all rights, 
66. For a more detailed analysis of the factual and judicial implications of the O.W. Bunker 
collapse, see Eugenio Vaccari, O.W. Bunker: A Common Law Perspective on Multi-Lateral Co-
Operation in Insolvency-Related Cases, 28 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 245 (2017) (U.K.). For a 
description of the company’s collapse see generally ALESSANDRO MAURO, GLOB. ASS’N OF RISK 
PROF’LS, THE RISE AND FALL OF OW BUNKER, THE WORLD’S LARGEST MARINE FUEL TANKER (2015).
67. Jingchen Xu, A Protective Method for Vessel Owners Following the Collapse of O.W. Bun-
ker: The Second Circuit Approval of Interpleader Actions in Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. 
Oil Trading, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM. 389, 403 (2016).
68. A copy of the agreement is available at O.W. Bunker & Trading A/S, PWC UK,
https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/ow_bunkers_charge_19_12_13_registration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WVL8-DB4T].
848 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:3
titles, and interests in third-party and inter-company receivables, both cur-
rent and future. In exchange, ING provided $700 million to O.W. Bunker 
in different currencies.
On November 7, 2014, the holding company of the O.W. Bunker 
group filed for bankruptcy in a Danish court, following an alleged fraud in 
its Singapore subsidiary and substantial losses relating to unsupervised 
over-the-counter trading. Shortly afterwards, on November 12, PwC was 
appointed as receiver for the security agreement. On November 13, the 
U.S. entities of the group (O.W. Bunker U.S.A., O.W. Bunker North Amer-
ica Inc., O.W. Bunker Holding U.S.A and North America) filed a chapter 
11 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut.69
On November 25, 2014, the receivers signed a cooperation agreement 
with the Danish trustees. According to this document, the receivers would 
pursue all global receivables assigned and charged to ING. All recoveries 
would be deposited to ING accounts, and the parties would later deter-
mine—either among themselves or pursuant to a decision of the domestic 
court—which receivables were not covered by the security agreement.70
This agreement was followed by similar documents with many other insol-
vency practitioners appointed in national bankruptcy procedures, including 
the United Kingdom, Singapore, and China.71
Preliminarily, it is interesting to observe that the collapse of the Dan-
ish holding company has resulted in few cross-border bankruptcy proce-
dures. In the United States, only O.W. Bunker Germany filed a chapter 15 
petition, on November 11, 2015.72 To date, O.W. Bunker Holding has not 
yet filed a petition for a recognition of a foreign proceeding under § 1515.
This may be due to a variety of reasons. It may have been perceived as 
unnecessary as, under U.S. bankruptcy law, a chapter 15 order is not a pre-
condition for the recognition of relief measures if the representative is only 
acting in U.S. courts to collect or recover a claim that is the property of the 
foreign debtor or estate.73 Additionally, the circumstance that in Denmark 
69. In re O.W. Bunker Holding N. Am., Inc., No. 14-51720, 2014 WL 7669372, at *1 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. Dec. 8, 2014).
70. Press Release, PwC UK et al., OW Bunker Group—Co-Operation Agreement Between 
Trustees (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/owbunker_26nov14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GA5-Z4SD].
71. There is no evidence of a similar agreement for the U.S. procedure.
72. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re OW Ger. GmbH, No. 15-13018 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov 11, 
2015), ECF No. 1. This led to the decision in Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v U.S. Oil Trading LLC, 
814 F.3d 146, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2016), where the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to 
deny O.W. Bunker Germany’s motion to have non-maritime lien issues decided by the bankruptcy court 
and retain the case in its entirety.
73. Martin, supra note 38, at 607.
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neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the EU Recast Regulation may 
have played a significant role.
However, the absence of a foreign main bankruptcy procedure result-
ed in the potential risk for ship owners and charterers to be subject to dou-
ble, and in some cases, triple liability, as all unpaid entities in the chain of 
contracts described below commenced actions against them to recover their 
entitlements. While this risk had been partially reduced by the use of inter-
pleader actions,74 the lack of a global bankruptcy procedure has impacted 
on co-ordination practiced between national courts.
Before analysing the legal issues of this case, it is to be determined if
O.W. Bunker is so unique in the context of cross-border bankruptcy cases 
that it does not represent an appropriate case study. In the opinion of the 
author, this question should be answered in the negative.
It is true that the shipping industry is international in its nature, and 
that some adaptations are needed when bankruptcy courts deal with ship-
ping cases. For instance, in Yakushiji v Daiichi Chuo Kisen Kaisha,75 the
Federal Court of Australia held that applications relating to debtors in-
volved in shipping were required to satisfy more extensive advertising re-
quirements.76
At the same time, it does not appear that the uniqueness of the ship-
ping industry is so significant to justify the exclusion of maritime traders 
from the scope of the UNCITRAL Model Law. In fact, when it comes to 
restrictions on the application of the UNCITRAL Model Law, national 
statutes tend to exclude credit and insurance institutions to various degrees. 
Some of them also exclude individuals (e.g., Greece), specific sectors of 
the industry, such as corporations that provide essential services (e.g., Aus-
tralia), and railroads (e.g., United States and Canada), but—to the 
knowledge of the authors—none of the ratifying states exclude shipping 
companies from its scope.
As a result, we can trustingly conclude that the O.W. Bunker saga is 
not exceptional enough to become unique.
74. See, e.g., Hapag-Lloyd, 814 F.3d at 149–53. Interpleader actions are judicial procedures 
where a debtor facing competing claims from several, alleged creditors brings proceedings to join the 
claimants, and pays the money into court. It will be to the court to determine who is entitled to the 
money.
75. [2015] FCA 1170 (2 November 2015) (Austl.).
76. See id. [24]–[25].
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A. O.W. Bunker: The Legal Issues?
From the narrative here, it seems that the two main obstacles to a co-
ordinated solution of the O.W. Bunker collapse were the lack of available 
cross-border remedies in Denmark and the possibility that some creditors 
could rely on a maritime law device known as a “maritime lien.”
The statutory deficiency is arguably not problematic, as mechanisms 
to coordinate cross-border bankruptcy procedures existed well before the 
enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law.77 The second conundrum is 
more controversial. The treatment of maritime liens brings to the fore is-
sues that are truly international, as ships travel across the world.
Maritime liens are quite unique in the law,78 to the point that one 
commentator observed that “a lien is a lien is a lien, but a maritime lien is 
not.”79 The existence of maritime liens rests on the principle that a vessel is 
a legal entity itself, apart from its ownership. The lien is not a security in-
terest arising from the personal obligation of the vessel’s owner or operator 
under a contract, but instead the vessel itself owes obligations that may be 
breached.
Maritime liens are subject to uniform rules in the Anglo-American 
tradition. They arise by operation of law out of services rendered to, or 
injuries caused by, a maritime property.80 They are not required to be filed 
or recorded for perfection: they attach to the rem simultaneously with the 
cause of action. Also, they do not necessarily require notice or possession 
(unlike land-law-type liens).
77. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiations, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J.
567 (2003); Paul H. Zumbro, Cross-Border Insolvencies and International Protocols—An Imperfect but 
Effective Tool, 11 BUS. L. INT’L 157 (2010); Rosalind Mason, Cross-Border Insolvency and Legal 
Transnationalisation, 21 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 105 (2012); IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 37 (2018).
For a comprehensive list of cross-border cases where protocols were used, see cases cited 
infra note 148, and MEVORACH, supra, ch. 1. Well-known cases include: In re Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (No. 2) [1992] BCC 715 (AC) (Eng.); In re Maxwell Communications 
Corp. [1993] 1 WLR 1402 (Ch) (Eng.); In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 
2001); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 15, 2008); and In 
re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Jan. 14, 2009).
78. Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Cibro Sales Corp., 601 F.2d 1385, 1389 (10th Cir. 1979) (“The mari-
time lien is a unique security device which serves the dual purpose of keeping ships moving in com-
merce while not allowing them to escape their debts by sailing away.”).
79. Michael A. Orlando, A Lien Is a Lien Is a Lien, but a Maritime Lien is Not, INT’L RISK 
MGMT. INST. (June 2003) (emphasis added), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/a-lien-
is-a-lien-is-a-lien-but-a-maritime-lien-is-not [https://perma.cc/BBV2-ABSK].
80. See Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, § 21(2) (Eng.); 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2012); see also Pied-
mont & George’s Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1920).
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Maritime liens are equitable in nature81: they can take priority over 
any other “traditional” security interest because they are designed to protect 
equitable interests.82 These special, privileged claims upon sea-connected 
properties remain valid despite changes in the ownership of the vessel. The 
law of the ship’s nationality governs the existence and priority of maritime 
liens, but certain characteristics—such as their priority over non-maritime 
liens and the preponderance of the right of the most recent lienholder—
stem from the enforcement and recognition of the 1952 Convention on the 
Arrest of Seagoing Ships.83
As a general rule, maritime liens can only be enforced under the mari-
time jurisdiction of a civil (federal in the United States) court. However, 
there is a valid English precedent according to which the proper procedure 
to enforce a maritime lien on a vessel belonging to a company which has 
been ordered to be wound up is by a proceeding in the winding-up, and not 
by a proceeding in rem in the Admiralty Court.84
Maritime liens are potentially disruptive for bankruptcy cases, since 
they allow the holders of this “nuclear weapon of maritime law” to leapfrog 
the ordinary order of payment of creditors in bankruptcy. In fact, despite 
the majority of bankruptcy law systems recognizing some priority and 
preferential treatment to selected creditors, the general rule remains the 
pari passu distribution among creditors. Maritime rules, on the other hand, 
would grant to otherwise unsecured claimants the right to satisfy their 
claims in preference to other equally or higher-ranking creditors. Courts, 
especially in the United States, have consistently ruled out the possibility 
that bankruptcy rules could affect maritime claims.85
81. See e.g., In re Welsh Irish Ferries Ltd. (The Ugland Trailer) [1986] Ch 471 (Eng.); The 
Kalfarli, 277 F. 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1921).
82. See The Charles Amelia (1868) 2 LRA & E. 330 (Eng.) (maritime liens prevail over non-
maritime claims, including bankruptcy ones); United States v ZP Chandon, 889 F.2d 233, 234 (9th Cir. 
1989).
83. International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, May 10, 1952, 439 
U.N.T.S. 193.
84. In re Austl. Direct Steam Navigation Co. (1877) 5 Ch D 70 (Eng.).
85. See, e.g., In re New Eng. Transp. Co., 220 F. 203, 207 (D. Conn. 1914) (finding there is a 
general rule “[w]here a maritime lien exists, either a court of bankruptcy or of equity will enforce such a 
lien with the same effect as would a court of admiralty”); Walsh v. Placedo Shipping Corp. of Liber. (In 
re Pac. Caribbean Shipping (U.S.A.), Inc.), 789 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); ZP Chandon, 889 F.2d 
at 238 (automatic stay provision does not apply to maritime liens, and lien has priority over preferred 
ship mortgage); McAllister Towing v. Ambassador Factors (In re Topgallant Lines, Inc.), 154 B.R. 368, 
376 (S.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d sub nom. McAllister Towing v. Ambassador, 20 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(maritime liens prevail over non-maritime claims, including bankruptcy ones).
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However, is there really no other option than an open contrast between 
bankruptcy and maritime rules? The author argues that there are grounds to 
build a harmonious relationship between them.
Firstly, the “need” for a special forum. If it was possible to agree on 
general principles for the treatment of maritime liens in bankruptcy (do-
mestic and cross-border) cases, there would be no need to assert that either 
bankruptcy or maritime/civil courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
these claims.
Systematic reasons may therefore suggest that only one court should 
have jurisdiction over all other disputes in bankruptcy cases. This is a posi-
tion which has been expressed by the English courts in the past. Regard-
less, it is undeniable that as the admiralty proceeding is in rem (it is the 
vessel—and not a person—that is the party defendant86), the resulting 
judgment is theoretically enforceable anywhere in the world.87
This claim is, however, valid only in theory, as domestic courts may 
decline to enforce foreign admiralty judgments on the same grounds as 
bankruptcy ones.
Secondly, the asserted incompatibility between substantive bankruptcy 
and maritime rules. Courts have recognised that maritime liens may affect 
certainty in international commerce,88 and criteria can be agreed on to es-
tablish a sufficient degree of coordination between bankruptcy and mari-
time tenets.
In several cross-border cases, courts have been willing to accept that 
local assets were distributed according to the order of priority established 
by the national domestic law, even if this contrasted with the principles or 
rules applicable under the law of the foreign main proceeding.89 A similar 
approach was taken by the High Court of New Zealand in Cornelius 
86. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67, 75 (D. Md. 1949).
87. Xu, supra note 67, at 393.
88. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 982 F.2d 765, 768 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a strict interpretative approach of the notion of “maritime lien” is in keeping with the 
overriding purpose of maritime liens and necessary to prevent a proliferation of liens, which might 
hinder international commerce).
89. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, see supra note 9, at 6–7 (enacted both in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom), while foreign creditors have the same right as local ones to com-
mence or participate in an insolvency proceeding, they cannot require the application of their national 
distribution rules. Ranking of claims is not affected by the foreign nature of the creditors. Additionally, 
in the United Kingdom, in an Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 426 case, all the Supreme Judges agreed 
that Parliament had given courts the authority to remit the assets to foreign insolvency practitioners 
even when distribution would not be in accordance with English distribution rules. See generally
McGrath v. Riddell [2008] UKHL 21 (appeal taken from Eng.).
2018] THE AMMANATI AFFAIR 853
Verolme,90 where the court held that maritime liens for unpaid wages and 
redundancy payments enjoy an absolute priority over any conflicting claim, 
even if secured and even during a bankruptcy proceeding. However, the 
request for arrest could be denied, and the recognition of a foreign proceed-
ing could be granted if the trustee agreed that the beneficiaries of the mari-
time priority would continue to rank at the very top in the ranking of 
creditors.
Thirdly, the asserted need to prioritise maritime over bankruptcy prin-
ciples. Of particular relevance is the position adopted by the Australian 
courts in cross-border maritime cases, where a petition for the recognition 
of a foreign proceeding had been filed pursuant to the Cross-Border Insol-
vency Act 2008.91
In several leading cases, the Australian federal courts were asked to 
provide automatic or discretionary relief to a shipping company that was 
undertaking a restructuring proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction. In particu-
lar, courts were asked to provide protection to the sea-connected properties 
of these companies by denying the right to arrest the vessels pursuant to a 
valid maritime lien.
Unlike in the United Kingdom and the United States, where bankrupt-
cy courts have consistently found in favour of the lien-holders, Australian 
courts have adopted a more nuanced approach based on a comprehensive 
analysis of the circumstances of the case.
For example, the court in Kim v Daebo International Shipping Co
Ltd92 relied on the preparatory materials of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and the domestic ratifying process to conclude that it was not the intention 
of the legislator to affect the maritime creditors’ rights to proceed in rem,
but the earlier case Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd93 and the subsequent deci-
sion in Tai-Soo Suk v Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd94 demonstrated that there are 
circumstances in which maritime lien actions can be stayed.
This lack of consistency in the approach to the interaction between 
admiralty and bankruptcy law over the enforcement of maritime liens sug-
gests that efforts should be made to explore alternative mechanisms to 
reach consistent decisions in cross-border bankruptcy cases. One of these 
alternative paths could be a revised notion of collectivity.
90. Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v. The Ship “Cornelius Verolme” [1997] 2 NZLR 110
(HC) (N.Z.).
91. Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) pt 2 (Austl.) (enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law 
into Australian law).
92. (2015) 232 FCR 275 (Austl.).
93. Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd (In re STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd) (2013) 223 FCR 189 (Austl.).
94. [2016] FCA 1404 (23 November 2016) (Austl.).
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Finally, if maritime liens were the issue in the O.W. Bunker case, it 
should be expected that in those jurisdictions that do not recognise mari-
time liens for necessaries like fuel bunkers, the case would have run 
smoothly in front of the judge responsible for the bankruptcy case.
In the United Kingdom, parties cannot claim the existence of a mari-
time lien for necessaries.95 Nevertheless, the O.W. Bunker collapse resulted 
in a litigation that was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. This sug-
gests that other factors may have hindered a coordinated solution of the 
O.W. Bunker collapse. The next section reports on the maritime litigation 
in the O.W. Bunker case in the United Kingdom and the United States to 
suggest an alternative explanation for the coordination problems evidenced 
in the case.
B. O.W. Bunker: The Maritime Litigation
A comprehensive recitation of the litigation in the O.W. Bunker case 
to date is beyond the limits of this paper, and it would be of limited contri-
bution to this Article. The following section covers the decisions that—in 
the author’s view—are most significant to understand the legal complexi-
ties of the O.W. Bunker case.
* * *
In the United Kingdom,96 the end users filed some arbitral and judicial 
claims to determine to whom they owed the money for the fuel bunkers 
they bought for their ships (i.e., the physical suppliers, the traders, or any of 
the companies in between).
If the contract was qualified as a “sale of goods” (as the title suggest-
ed), recovery of the price was possible by the seller only in circumstances 
where the property has passed to the buyer. However, all contracts were 
95. Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, § 21(2) (Eng.). The Senior Courts Act 1981 states that an 
action in rem against the ship or the property in connection with which the claim or question arises can 
be brought only for the following reasons:
? claims to the possession or ownership of all or part of the ship;
? questions on “possession, employment, or earnings” of a ship between co-owners;
? claims “in respect of a mortgage of or charge on a ship”; and
? claims for the “forfeiture or condemnation of a ship or of goods which are being or have 
been carried, or have been attempted to be carried, in a ship, or for the restoration of a 
ship or any such goods after seizure, or for droits of Admiralty.”
Id. § 20(2)(a)–(c), (s).
96. Peter Walker, Bunker Mentality, CREDIT MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2016), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-4214429511.html [https://perma.cc/U8UN-DTK6] (describing 
English litigation).
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subject to a ROT clause. Hence, the owners argued that they were bound to 
pay neither ING or O.W. Bunker nor, as a consequence, their physical sup-
pliers as they had never been in contractual relations with them.97
The matter was decided first by a panel of arbitrators, and then by the 
English courts.98 It is known as The Res Cogitans99 saga, from the name of 
the ship. The Supreme Court concluded (in line with the reasoning of the 
arbitrators and the lower courts) that there was a valid contractual obliga-
tion between the owners of the vessel and O.W. Bunker. This granted its 
assignee ING the right to recover the price agreed for the transaction.100
In the English litigation, courts paid little if any consideration to the 
fact that the debtor was part of a bankruptcy procedure. Their rulings have 
been based entirely on commercial and admiralty law arguments, even if 
similar and less contentious conclusions could have been achieved by ap-
plying the English bankruptcy law rules on the qualification of claims and 
distribution of assets and proceeds in bankruptcy cases.
This lack of proper consideration for the bankruptcy procedure also 
characterised the U.S. cases. While U.S. law recognises the existence of 
maritime liens for necessaries,101 substantially all courts concluded that the 
physical suppliers did not have a right to a maritime lien,102 with many 
97. Liron Shmilovits, Testing the Limits of Interpretation, 2016 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 20
(2016) (U.K.) (“[A] contest between two arguably incredible propositions.”).
98. PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v. O.W. Bunker Malta Ltd. [2015] EWHC (Comm) 2022 (Eng.); 
PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v. O.W. Bunker Malta Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 1058; PST Energy 7 
Shipping LLC v. O.W. Bunker Malta Ltd. [2016] UKSC 23 (appeal taken from Eng.).
99. Latin expression for “a thinking thing.” It is part of the mental-substance theory of the philos-
opher Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae. Lord Mance commented in the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
“Despite the significance of her name in Cartesian philosophy, the vessel “Res Cogitans” depends on 
bunkers.” PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC [2016] UKSC 23, [1].
100. Not all commentators agreed with the Supreme Court. See David Osler, Pappas to Seek 
Supreme Court Appeal in OW Bunker Test Case, LLOYD’S LIST (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://lloydslist.com/ll/news/article516527.ece [http://perma.cc/VWK3-RJCJ] (describing this decision 
as “the most spectacular shipping legal imbroglio in this century”); Andrew Tettenborn, Of Bunkers and 
Retention of Title: When Is a Sale not a Sale?, 2016 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 24, 26 (2016) (U.K.) 
(“[T]he potential problem of the non-applicability of the Sale of Goods Act [is] more serious than 
immediately apparent.”); Michael Bridge, The UK Supreme Court Decision in The Res Cogitans and 
the Cardinal Role of Property in Sales Law, 2017 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 363 (2017) (“At no point 
in The Res Cogitans does anyone appear to stand back from the matter in dispute to consider the sys-
temic consequences of the decision . . . .”); Felix W.H. Chan, Rights to Consume Bunkers Before Pay-
ment: Neither as a Bailee nor as an Owner, 28 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 104 (2017) (U.K.).
For a more positive valuation, see Eugene Cheng Jiankai, Interpleading the OW Saga, 28 SING. ACAD.
L.J. 631, 648 (2016) (hailing with favour the outcome of the case as it brought “certainty to the bunker-
ing industry”), Henry Moore, Unconventional “Sales,” 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 465, 468 (2016) (U.K.); 
Shmilovits, supra note 97, at 22 (“There is no doubt that the common-sense outcome was reached in 
this case. The question is whether, in reaching it, the court properly applied the law.”).
101. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2012).
102. See ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Temara, 203 F. Supp. 3d 355, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); O’Rourke 
Marine Servs. L.P. v. M/V COSCO Haifa, 179 F. Supp. 3d 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that a 
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recognising O.W. Bunker’s right to a maritime lien103 (on one occasion, 
based on considerations of equity and public policy104) and some denying 
the existence of any lien.105
Finally, Martin Energy marked another blow to bankruptcy law, as the 
court held that it was entitled to decide the order of distribution of the pro-
ceeds on its own, as if the collapse and the bankruptcy petition had never 
occurred.106 As a result, ING (and the bankruptcy proceeding) were award-
ed only the profit margin they originally negotiated for the transaction 
($3900), while the suppliers were paid the full amount invoiced to O.W. 
Bunker ($286,000), despite them being unsecured creditors in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.107
C. O.W. Bunker: Conclusive Remarks
The described state of affairs prompted some criticism from the aca-
demic community,108 which observed that the current framework lacks 
balance. In particular, bankruptcy scholars could not find any rationale to 
justify why bunker suppliers should be preferred to all other unsecured 
creditors simply by reason of the product delivered and the area of law 
governing the agreement (maritime law).109 Reliance on the ROT clause 
can be of little help either, as it is challenging to justify the validity of this 
clause when the seller accepted that the goods provided would be con-
sumed before payment became due.
These cases seriously affect the rights, legal interests, and enforceable 
expectations of all the claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, 
subcontractor that provided necessaries to a vessel cannot assert maritime lien unless it can show that 
the vessel or its owner specifically directed that subcontractor to be selected as physical supplier).
103. Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd. v. O.W. Bunker (Switz.) SA, 239 F. Supp. 3d 674, 692 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); Barcliff, LLC v. M/V Deep Blue, 2016 A.M.C. 2901, 2929 (S.D. Ala. 2016), aff’d,
876 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2017).
104. Clearlake Shipping Pte. Ltd. v. O.W. Bunker (Switz.) SA, No. 14–CV–9287 (VEC), 2017 
WL 78514 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017), amended and superseded by Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd., 239 F. 
Supp. 3d 674.
105. ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Temara, 2016 A.M.C. 2946, 2959 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
106. Martin Energy Servs. v. M/V Bravante IX, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1273 (N.D. Fla. 2017).
107. Id.
108. Mike Burns, Clarity on Shipowners’ Bunker Payment Obligations?, MAR. RISK INT’L (Sept. 
9, 2015), https://www.maritime-risk-intl.com/insurance-and-finance/finance/clarity-on-shipowners-
bunker-payment-obligations-111396.htm [https://perma.cc/3RG3-8WV6]; Ji Lian Yap, Predictability,
Certainty, and Party Autonomy in the Sale and Supply of Goods, 46 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 269
(2017).
109. Adrian Moylan, Bankruptcy and Unpaid Bunkers—a Global Dilemma for Shipping, MAR.
RISK INT’L (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.maritime-risk-intl.com/insurance-and-
finance/finance/bankruptcy-and-unpaid-bunkers—a-global-dilemma-for-shipping-106302.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9FNP-Y4HR].
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they have been conducted in several jurisdictions, with little or no coordi-
nation, not only on a cross-border, but sometimes even on a domestic level 
(as the Clearlake and Temara rulings prove). Also, the mandatory nature of 
bankruptcy provisions has entirely been disregarded.
The procedural, objective notion of collectivity is respected. However, 
what is left is mainly an empty shell. The next session investigates if we 
should look at the past for a novel understanding of the notion of collectivi-
ty.
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMMANATI “BANK”
The Ammanati case is widely known in the bankruptcy community, 
primarily as the episode that first evidenced the benefits associated with a 
unitary and universal management of a cross-border bankruptcy proce-
dure.110 This paper cursorily covers its facts111 to understand if this case can 
still guide scholars in the troubled waters of cross-disciplinary (i.e., mari-
time and bankruptcy law, finance and bankruptcy law) and cross-border 
bankruptcy cases.
The Ammanati Bank of Pistoja was, rather than a bank, a merchant 
company, with a variety of branches and business interests.112 Additionally, 
charging interests on deposits and loans (“usury”)113 was not simply a sin 
in the eyes of the Church, but a behaviour prohibited by secular statutes. It 
was only in the mid-seventeenth century in Protestant countries that usury 
passed from being an offence against public morality that a Christian gov-
ernment was expected to suppress, to a matter of private conscience.
Bankers’ practices were on the fringe of legitimate business, but bank-
ers would strongly deny acting outside the teaching of the Church. In fact, 
canon scholars developed theories to identify which transactions were per-
110. MIKAEL BERGLUND, CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS IN THE EU: HISTORY,
PRESENT TIME AND FUTURE 59 (2009); Nicki Kayser, A Study of the European Convention on Insol-
vency Proceedings, 7 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 95 (1998).
111. See André Fliniaux, La Faillite des Ammanati de Pistoie et le Saint-Siège (Début du XIVe 
Siècle), 3 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 436 (1924) (Fr.). For a shorter sum-
mary, see David C. Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement; Les Prospects pour 
une Convention de la Faillite en Amerique du Nord; Los Prospectos para un Convenio de Quiebra de 
Norte America, 2 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 81 (1995) (despite the mistake on the year of the bankruptcy 
collapse), and Anton Trichardt, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 6 FLINDERS 
J.L. REFORM 95 (2002).
112. RAYMOND DE ROOVER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MEDICI BANK 1397–1494 (Beard 
Books 1999) (1963).
113. Id. at 10 (“According to canon law, usury consisted in any increment, whether small or large, 
demanded above the principal solely on the strength of a mutuum . . . . [This doctrine] did not apply to 
exorbitant rates only, but extended to all interest . . . .”).
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mitted under the law. Bankers were known as money-changers, and they 
were members of local corporations (gilde) who protected their interests.
The Ammanati “holding,” or super-company,114 became insolvent in 
1302, and its downfall was sudden and unexpected. While previous cases 
of the Gran Tavola (great table or bank) of the Buonsignori (Siena) and of 
the Ricciardi merchant bankers (Lucca) were due primarily to adverse con-
ditions in the market, the causes of the Ammanati collapse were primarily 
political.115 It resulted in one of the first known successful liquidations in 
history where a universal approach to the collection and distribution of 
assets was taken.
In 1302, the bank closed its branch in Rome, and this caused particular 
concern at the Holy See, as both the pope and the clergy had deposited a 
significant amount of money in the bank. The merchant bank had assets all 
over Europe: in different states of the Italian peninsula, as well as in the 
Spanish states, Portugal, England, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. 
However, while the creditors of the bank mainly resided in Rome, the 
bank’s debtors were primarily located in other European states.
A. The Ammanati Case: The Legal Issues
Some time before the bankruptcy, the owners removed the assets from 
Rome to Pistoja. The owners fled to an unknown location and there were 
reasons to believe that they would attempt to dispose of the assets by de-
manding payment from the debtors of the bank.
Back in the fourteenth century, there was no legal cooperation be-
tween states on bankruptcy matters. Each domestic law prescribed autono-
mous measures, aimed at seizing and arresting the debtor and distributing 
its assets among its creditors.116 The consolidation of bankruptcy proce-
dures in statutory rules occurred throughout the fourteenth century, thanks 
to the “experience” maturated from the failure of merchant companies in 
the previous century. Guidance emerged also from the conciliatory mecha-
114. During the Middle Ages the concept of separate and limited liability for companies had yet to 
be recognised by the law. Large companies were an aggregation of smaller partnerships, where share-
holders usually retained unlimited liabilities for debt. The notion of a “super-company” is used to 
describe the agglomerate of companies that engaged in general commerce, banking and manufacturing 
in substantial volume, alongside with commodity trading. See EDWIN S. HUNT, THE MEDIEVAL SUPER-
COMPANIES: A STUDY OF THE PERUZZI COMPANY OF FLORENCE 3 (1994). The Peruzzi company was 
dissolved by reason of bankruptcy in 1347, and its business nature and structure were not dissimilar 
from those of the Ammanati bank. See RICHARD A. GOLDTHWAITE, THE ECONOMY OF RENAISSANCE 
FLORENCE 64–104 (2009).
115. BERGLUND, supra note 110.
116. David Graham, The Insolvent Italian Banks of Medieval London, 9 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV.
213 (2000).
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nisms conceived and devised in the main commercial centres in Northern 
Italy and in the Champagne fairs.117
Existing bankruptcy procedures were procedurally collective, as they 
aimed at freezing all individual litigations against the debtor, collecting his 
assets, and distributing them in a rateable manner.118 Statutes did not inno-
vate, but they codified what had already emerged as standard practice in 
commercial cases.119
Procedures were punitive and harsh for modern standards, as the 
creditors could recover the debt from the debtors120—and not (only) his 
property—or to enslave, kill or partes secare121 them. The procedures were 
also designed to punish, as debtors were considered both dishonest peo-
ple122 and infames et infamissimi.123 Centuries later, Pope Pius V still pre-
scribed the duty of insolvent debtors to carry on their head a birettum viride 
as a mark for their failures.124
Other states adopted similar punitive measures,125 the early English 
law being no exception as the ultimate penalty for defaulters was impris-
onment, often at their own expense, until the debt was paid.126 Imprison-
117. Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie, What Lessons for Economic Development Can We 
Draw from the Champagne Fairs?, 49 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 131, 131 (2012).
118. FRANCESCO MIGLIORINO, MYSTERIA CONCURSUS: ITINERARI PREMODERNI DEL DIRITTO 
COMMERCIALE 72 (1999) (It.).
119. Id. at 74.
120. Leges XII, BIBLIOTHECA AUGUSTANA, http://www.hs-
augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lsante05/LegesXII/leg_ta03.html [https://perma.cc/A4RF-MMG8] 
(describing Table III under the Roman law: Leges Duodecim Tabularum).
121. The creditors’ right to chop the insolvent debtor’s body into as many pieces as there were 
creditors. Id.
122. For a description of the status quo of the law in the period, see BOB WESSELS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 5–6 (2009).
123. 3 BALDO DEGLI UBALDI, CONSILIA (1490).
124. Pope Pius V, Postquam Eousque Humana Processit Intemperantia (Nov. 1, 1570), in 4
BULLARUM: AMPLISSIMA COLLECTIO 131 (1746).
125. MIGLIORINO, supra note 118, at 122.
126. See Matthew J. Baker et al., Debtors’ Prisons in America: An Economic Analysis, 84 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 216, 216 (2012). In writing on bankrupts, Daniel Defoe, the author of Robinson Cru-
soe, commented that the English law on the subject “has something in it of barbarity . . . .” DANIEL 
DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 192 (1697).
For the U.K. perspective, see Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment 
for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351 (2014). For a U.S. perspective, see Richard Ford, Imprisonment
for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24 (1926), CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1935), PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR 
DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900 (1974), and BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002). For an Anglo-American perspective, 
see Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the Development of Bankruptcy 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229 (2010). For a European perspective, see Dave De Ruysscher, Business Rescue, 
Turnaround Management, and the Legal Regime of Default and Insolvency in Western Europe (Late 
Middle Ages to Present Day), in TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY 22, 29 (Jan Adri-
aanse & Jean-Pierre van der Rest eds., 2017).
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ment for debt persisted until the mid-nineteenth century, despite the exist-
ence of non-punitive bankruptcy procedures since the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury.127
The Roman clergy stood to lose the most from this uncoordinated ap-
proach. Despite the Bible’s suggestion that if a debt is unpaid, the debtor 
could be killed or sold into slavery,128 this prospect looked rather unappeal-
ing to the Church. Therefore, Pope Boniface VIII, “a sovereign not bound 
by worldly frontiers,”129 took an active role in finding a better solution for 
the interest of the bank’s creditors.130 The Holy See issued orders to:
? prevent the owners from disposing of their properties;
? prevent the bank’s debtors from paying their debts to the 
bankrupt debtor under threat of censuram ecclesiasticam; and
? force the bank’s debtors to pay their debts to the Church.
The vigorous intervention of the pope emphasised that a novel ap-
proach was needed to achieve a more efficient and fair distribution of the 
assets. An unstructured liquidation proceeding was not in the best interest 
of all stakeholders.131 As a result, he tried to ensure the cooperation of the 
debtor’s owners because they retained an interest in the orderly manage-
ment of the procedure, if not on the bankrupt company.
The pope offered the owners a safe conduct (salvus conductus) for the 
safe return to Rome if they were willing to reach a settlement with their 
creditors. He also used the worldwide financial system of the medieval 
papacy to collect assets throughout Europe and transfer the incoming mon-
ey to Rome. This brought some commentators to define this case as “one of 
the earliest examples of international insolvency by ‘decree.’”132
The collected assets were distributed according to a distribution rank-
ing, which ensured the payment of the administrative expenses of the pro-
127. Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153 (1982).
128. Matthew 18:24–35 describes an episode in which a debtor is sold into slavery to repay a debt.
129. JONA ISRAËL, EUROPEAN CROSS-BORDER REGULATION: A STUDY OF REGULATION 
1346/2000 ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN THE LIGHT OF A PARADIGM OF CO-OPERATION AND A 
COMITAS EUROPAEA 1 (2005) (emphasis added).
130. As Nadelmann observes, “[t]he papal registers show that Pope Boniface found it necessary, in 
the interest of the Curia, to take an active part in the solution of the difficult problems raised.” Kurt H. 
Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 58, 58 (1944).
131. Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It Neces-
sary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT’L L. 881 (1993). Gaa suggests that papal intervention was compelled by 
the need to ensure the benefit of all creditors, id. at 900, while this paper suggests that the interests of 
non-contractual creditors (such as the owners) were equally relevant in the determination of the pope.
132. WESSELS ET AL., supra note 122, at 2 (emphasis added).
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cedure, a de minimis return to the owners for their co-operation, and a pref-
erential treatment to certain categories of creditors (i.e., clergy).
B. The Ammanati Case: Towards an Equitable Definition of           
“Interested Parties”?
The Ammanati affair had a significant influence on future cases. 
While before this multi-national cross-border procedure the usual alterna-
tives were liquidation, or cessio bonorum, after this procedure settlements 
with creditors became more common. Not surprisingly, the failure of the 
Peruzzi company of Florence in 1343 resulted in a settlement with its credi-
tors under the supervision of a bankruptcy court in 1347.133 Furthermore, 
the involvement of bankruptcy courts marked a significant departure from 
the early years of uncoordinated and punitive liquidation procedures.134 His 
non-secular intervention resulted in an equitable outcome135 for this case.
Compared to the O.W. Bunker saga, the Ammanati affair suggests the 
opportunity to adopt an equitable, or at least more inclusive notion of col-
lectivity in cross-disciplinary and cross-border bankruptcy procedures. This 
section explores if this case is still contemporary,136 and if it is appropriate 
to re-consider the established and substantially uniform notion of collectivi-
ty in light of the findings of this case study.
* * *
Commentators are divided in two opposing schools of thought. Some 
argue that equity, or rather flexibility in the law is needed “to accommodate 
new practices and developments.”137 Others, on the contrary, believe that 
“paternalism [in the law] should be resisted.”138
Should judges adopt a more flexible interpretative attitude of the no-
tion of collectivity to mitigate the rigidity of common law rules?
It is granted that “good” flexibility should not come at the expense of 
fairness, predictability and certainty. The author also agrees that, in princi-
133. HUNT, supra note 114, at 35–36.
134. Their involvement is well documented. Almost 5000 volumes covering the activity of the 
court of Mercanzia in Florence for the years 1314–1600 is still conserved in the state archives. 
GOLDTHWAITE, supra note 114, at xiv.
135. NEIL HANNAN, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF 
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 6 (2017).
136. An opinion shared, even if for different reasons, by Gaa, supra note 131, at 900.
137. Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial Law, 14 MONASH U. L. REV. 135, 150 (1988).
138. Sarah Worthington, Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law, in 
THE COMMON LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: DIVERGENCE AND UNITY 301, 301 (Andrew Robertson & Mi-
chael Tilbury eds., 2016) (emphasis added).
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ple, sophisticated democracies usually promote rather than limit freedom of 
the parties, and to uphold the results of their negotiations.139
Nevertheless, the cases described in this study suggest that there may 
be limited occasions when it is not simply appropriate, but also recom-
mendable for judges to use their “equitable discretion.” This may be need-
ed, for instance, if we want to achieve one of the goals laid out in the Cork 
Report, namely aim (h):
to revise and safeguard the interests not merely of insolvents and their 
creditors but of society and other groups in society who are affected by 
the insolvency, for instance not only the interests of directors, sharehold-
ers and employees but also those of suppliers, those whose livelihoods 
depend on the enterprise and the community.140
However, judges cannot make law, and they have to be provided with 
appropriate legislative support to act in that way. To analyse when and to 
what extent we should depart from a procedural and stricti juris interpreta-
tion of the law, this section looks at the approach followed by the English 
and American courts to define their equitable powers. It then looks at 
whether courts have been willing to use these discretionary powers to ex-
tend the notion of the “interested party.”
U.S. and U.K. courts can rely on an established tradition in equity, 
even though they apply different standards when it comes to the use of their 
equitable powers. U.S. courts, relying on the letter of the law,141 use them 
when a literal interpretation of the law would produce results that contrast 
with the goal of the bankruptcy procedure.142 However, a basic tenet of 
U.S. equity jurisprudence is that the party seeking equitable relief must 
come to court with “clean hands.”143
English courts, on the other hand, have adopted a more cautious ap-
proach. Clearly stated for the first time in a liquidation context in Lundy
139. Id.
140. CORK REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1982, Cm. 8558
(U.K.).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
142. See Murgillo v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (In re Murgillo), 176 B.R. 524, 531–32 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1994); Norpak Corp. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., (In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc.), 131 F.3d 
1185, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ankruptcy courts ‘are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable pow-
ers to balance the interests of the affected parties, guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success 
of the reorganization.’” (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 389 
(1993))); In re Oglesby, 519 B.R. 699, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2014) (“[T]he bankruptcy court should 
exercise its equitable powers with respect to substance and not technical considerations that will prevent 
substantial justice.” (quoting In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1991)).
143. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Dodd (In re Dodd), 276 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2001); Gugino v. Kerslake (In re Clark), 543 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015).
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Granite,144 courts nowadays admit the use of discretionary powers in busi-
ness cases only when it would be unconscionable to allow the negotiated 
act or condition to take effect (“unconscionability test”).145
Nevertheless, in both jurisdictions, in cases involving large enterprises 
(which feature in disproportionately high numbers in cross-border proce-
dures),146 the need to preserve finality seems to prevail over the necessity to 
ensure fairness.147 This restrictive use of discretion is a welcome approach, 
because it prevents to invoke flexibility to affect the autonomy of the par-
ties, and hinder predictability and certainty in commercial cases.
U.S. and U.K. courts on some occasions have proven their willingness 
to employ wider and more equitable notions of ‘interested parties’ in pro-
cedures where a procedural, objective interpretation of established notions 
would lead to unfair or unjust results.148
This approach however if far from consistent and established, espe-
cially in the United Kingdom. For instance, in Purewal,149 the court held 
that receivers appointed by a bank in respect of a mortgaged property did 
not owe a duty of care to a mortgagor who had gone bankrupt. In Preston v. 
Green,150 the court held that a former director had no standing to apply for 
the rescission of an order for the winding up of a company because—
among other reasons—the law failed to recognise such a right to claimants 
other than creditors. Finally, in Frodstick,151 the court held that a bankrupt 
had no interest in the property of the bankruptcy estate. While this case was 
of personal nature, nothing suggests that different conclusions would be 
reached had the request come from a shareholder.
144. In re Lundy Granite Co. (1871) 6 Ch App. 462 (Eng.). Followed by, among others: In re MK
Airlines Ltd. [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2764; Pillar Denton Ltd. v. Jervis [2014] EWCA (Civ) 180.
145. Amble Assets LLP v Longbenton Foods Ltd. [2011] EWHC (Ch) 3774 (Eng.). However, in 
In re Co-Operative Bank Plc, [2013] EWHC (Ch) 4074, the court held that judicial discretion had to be 
exercised on a principled basis. As a result, it held that the modification of a scheme of arrangement for 
a bank was admissible because the bank had an equitable duty to its creditors, but not a fiduciary duty 
to a category of them. This despite the detriment that could cause to some creditors who have already 
taken steps (such as borrowing money) to purchase the discounted shares.
146. Martin, supra note 38, at 597–98.
147. McKinstry v. Richard Holmes Enters. (In re Black Diamond Mining Co.), No. 15-96-ART, 
2016 WL 3448287, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 16, 2016) (“Finality is important in litigation; people and 
companies must be able to move on with their lives.”).
148. For the U.S perspective, see Clearlake Shipping Pte. Ltd. v. O.W. Bunker (Switz.) SA, No. 
14–CV–9287 (VEC), 2017 WL 78514 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017) (discussing the appeal on jurisdiction for 
interpleader actions in the 2nd Circuit), amended and superseded by Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd. v. 
O.W. Bunker (Switz.) SA, 239 F. Supp. 3d 674, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). For the U.K. perspective, see 
Stena Bulk AB v. Copley [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 280 (QB) (Eng.).
149. Purewal v. Countrywide Residential Lettings Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 1122 (Eng.).
150. Preston v. Green (In re Cre8atsea Ltd.) [2016] EWHC (Ch) 2522 (Eng.).
151. Frosdick v. Fox [2017] EWHC (Ch) 1737 (Eng.).
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Other judges have demonstrated their willingness to adopt a more 
flexible and equitable approach. Cases of this kind include Ecology v.
Hellard,152 where, while the court applied an objective interpretation to the 
loan contract between the parties, it held that it might well have reached a 
different, opposite conclusion if the parties succeeded in proving that the 
transaction resulted in a breach of trust or was made under a state of mind 
that would make it unconscionable for the lender to retain the benefit of the 
loan receipt.153
Equitable inclusion of interested parties in the bankruptcy process 
would not lead to a modification of the creditors’ ranking. As observed by 
Judge Caproni in Clearlake v. O.W. Bunker:
[the physical suppliers’] real problem is the low priority given to an un-
secured creditor in a bankruptcy. A low priority in bankruptcy almost 
always causes hardship, but that is not something that this Court, even 
sitting in equity, can alleviate.154
Despite dissenting views, especially from academia,155 equitable pow-
ers can be used by the judiciary to extend the notion of the interested party 
and transform collectivity into a substantive, rather than a simple procedur-
al concept.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has suggested that in O.W. Bunker, the contentious issue 
has not been the application of maritime rules, but the interpretation of the 
notion of collectivity.
As a result, this paper is by no means advocating a return to the pre-
UNCITRAL situation, where common law jurisdictions relied on the prin-
ciple of comity, and commentators blamed courts for the uncertainty and 
152. Ecology Support Servs. Ltd v. Hellard [2017] EWHC (Ch) 160 (Eng.).
153. In the same vein: Sherlock Holmes Int’l. Soc’y Ltd. v. Aidiniantz [2016] EWHC (Ch) 1076 
(Eng.), and Stewart v. HM Attorney Gen. for N. Ir. (In re Spirit of Enniskillen Trust) [2013] NICh 10 
(N. Ir.).
154. Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd. v. O.W. Bunker (Switz.) SA, 239 F. Supp. 3d 674, 694 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (footnote omitted).
155. Peter von Wilmowsky, Insolvency Law: Its Roles and Principles, in DEALING WITH 
ECONOMIC FAILURE: BETWEEN NORM AND PRACTICE (15TH TO 21ST CENTURY) 243, 246–47 (Albrecht 
Cordes & Magrit Schulte Beerbühl eds., 2016). Peter von Wilmowsky answered in the negative to the 
question of whether public interests should be considered when deciding how a debtor’s firm is to be 
deployed. He observed that “insolvency (asset deployment) law is not the proper forum for considering 
matters of the public interest and exerting influence on entrepreneurial decisions.” Id. at 246. He also
stated that measures to combat the social costs triggered by the termination of firms “must apply equal-
ly both within and outside insolvency; they must be independent of insolvency.” Id. at 247.
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unpredictability of their decisions.156 However, cases like O.W. Bunker
show that a procedural understanding of some key notions of bankruptcy 
law may lead to uncertainty, extensive litigation and inefficient outcomes.
What this paper is advocating is a further specification of some pow-
ers that have already been entrusted to bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy 
courts should have the right to issue judgments on all bankruptcy-related 
matters. They should employ their equitable powers to refuse recognition 
of foreign proceedings when they determine that the interests of all stake-
holders—including the debtor—have not been adequately protected.
It may therefore be appropriate to introduce a more flexible notion of 
collectivity—maybe in the UNCITRAL Model Law, or in the recitals of 
the EU Recast Regulation—to achieve a higher degree of approximation in 
the practice.
This approach is expected to favour, rather than hinder, a higher de-
gree of harmonization and cooperation in multinational and cross-
disciplinary bankruptcy procedures. It may also avoid inconsistencies in the 
treatment of cross-border cases, especially in those countries where the 
civil/maritime litigation in the O.W. Bunker saga would have contrasted 
with the law on the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings.157
This more flexible approach would also be beneficial in non-
bankruptcy cases. Since the UNCITRAL Model Law applies to judicial or 
administrative proceedings governed by a law relating to bankruptcy, it is 
possible that recognition is demanded in cases where the dissolution or 
restructuring of a company is not triggered by its insolvency.158 In these 
circumstances, the inclusion of a larger number of stakeholders may follow 
from the nature of the proceeding itself.
156. This is a common criticism in particular in the United States, where many commentators 
criticised the subjective nature of the former statutory framework determined by 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2004) 
(repealed 2005) for affording too much discretion to courts. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 38, at 600.
157. This is, for instance, the case in Japan, where article 25(1)(2) of the Gaikokutosanshoritetsu-
zuki no Shonin Enjo nikansuru Horitsu [Law on Recognition of and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency 
Proceedings], Law No. 129 of 2000, extends the automatic stay to litigation as well as to execution 
upon recognition of the foreign proceeding. Shin-ichiro Abe, Japan, in 1 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 38, at 321, 327.
158. For the United States, see In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009), and In re
Millard, 501 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). For the United Kingdom, see Ho, supra note 39, at 
186 (“[A] foreign proceeding under the British Model Law is not restricted to a proceeding in relation 
to a debtor that is technically insolvent.”). This conclusion contrasts with the decision taken in other 
common law countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, including Australia. In that 
country, the government implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law pursuant to the approach recom-
mended by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (“CLERP”). The CLERP 8 report recom-
mended not to extend the scope of the Model Law to receiverships and to other non-bankruptcy related 
procedures, including members’ voluntary winding ups. THE TREASURY, CORP. LAW ECON. REFORM 
PROGRAM, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: PAPER NO. 8, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: PROMOTING
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 23 (2002) (Austl.).
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Also, it is submitted that this more flexible and inclusive approach 
could be gradually extended to all countries that adopt the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. This is possible thanks to the consistent interpretation provi-
sion in the UNCITRAL document (article 8), as well as to the existence of 
the Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (“CLOUT”) service.159
The Ammanati affair proves that it is possible to defy established con-
ventions, without revolutionising the system. The UNCITRAL Model Law 
and the EU Recast Regulation may nowadays play the role entrusted to the 
“sovereign not bound by worldly frontiers” in the Ammanati saga.
159. This service is made available by UNCITRAL Secretariat. The system collects and dissemi-
nates information on court decisions and arbitral awards relating to the Conventions and Model Laws 
that have emanated from the work of the Commission. The purpose of the system is to promote interna-
tional awareness of the legal texts formulated by the Commission and to facilitate uniform interpreta-
tion and application of those texts. For more information, see Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT),
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UK8-FKU3].
